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dc.contributor.authorAli Yavuz POLAT
dc.contributor.authorHasan TEKİN
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-18T09:31:29Z
dc.date.available2021-06-18T09:31:29Z
dc.date.issued2020en_US
dc.identifier.issn2147-7655
dc.identifier.issn2149-4622
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.18506/anemon.712351
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12573/810
dc.description.abstractThe problems of agency and risk sharing arise due to the separation of ownership and control of a large firm, when conflicts of interest exist between principals (owners) and agents (managers). The main source of these problems is asymmetric information, which implies an agency cost for the principal. Agency theory, which is still one of the fundamental theories in corporate finance, focuses on minimizing costs in agency relations. This study critically evaluates the principal-agent relations, focusing on the interaction between the shareholder-manager and bondholder-shareholder in corporate finance.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherTÜBİTAK ULAKBİM Ulusal Akademik Ağ ve Bilgi Merkezi Cahit Arf Bilgi Merkezien_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.18506/anemon.712351en_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectCorporate Finance (CF)en_US
dc.subjectCapital Structure Decisions (CSDs)en_US
dc.subjectAgency Theoryen_US
dc.titleAgency Theory: A Review in Financeen_US
dc.title.alternativeVekalet Teorisi: Finans Alanında Bir İncelemeen_US
dc.typearticleen_US
dc.contributor.departmentAGÜ, Yönetim Bilimleri Fakültesi, Ekonomi Bölümüen_US
dc.identifier.volumeCilt: 8 Sayı: 4 Sayfa: 1323 - 1329en_US
dc.relation.journalAnemon Muş Alparslan Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisien_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Ulusal - Editör Denetimli Dergien_US


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