



**TWO DIMENSIONS OF INTERPERSONAL
TOLERANCE: THEIR PREVALENCE AND ETIOLOGY
IN WORLD CIVILIZATIONS**

**KİŞİLERARASI HOŞGÖRÜNÜN İKİ BOYUTU: DÜNYA
MEDENİYETLERİNDEKİ YAYGINLIK VE
NEDENBİLİMLERİ**

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ABSTRACT

This research provides three additional insights into the concept of tolerance. First, it provides empirical insights to the previous research, distinguishing between two dimensions of tolerance; political tolerance and social tolerance. Second, it investigates the extent these two dimensions of tolerance prevail in different civilizations in the world. Third, it shows how etiology of tolerance differs across civilizations. In short, this research shows that tolerance of national and religious groups differs from tolerance of social groups in both kind and degree and investigates to what extent the prevalence and etiology of these two dimensions of tolerance differ across civilizations. In this research time series evidence from subsequent rounds of the World Values Survey (WVS) for over seventy countries are analysed using Ordered Probit models.

Keywords: Political Tolerance, Social Tolerance, Democracy, World Civilizations, World Values Survey.

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* Makale Geliş Tarihi: 12.04.2019
Makale Kabul Tarihi: 09.09.2019

ÖZ

Bu araştırma, hoşgörü kavramına üç yeni bakış açısı sunmaktadır. İlk olarak bu çalışma hoşgörünün siyasi hoşgörü ve sosyal hoşgörü olmak üzere iki boyutunu birbirinden ayırtan önceki çalışmalara deneysel bir kavrayış katmaktadır. İkinci olarak dünya medeniyetlerinde bu iki hoşgörü boyutunun yaygınlığını araştırmaktadır. Üçüncü olarak ise hoşgörü nedenbiliminin bu medeniyetler arasında nasıl farklılaştığını göstermektedir. Kısacası, bu araştırma ulusal ve dini gruplara yönelik hoşgörünün sosyal gruplara yönelik hoşgörüden hem tür hem de derece olarak farklı olduğunu göstermekte ve bu iki hoşgörü boyutunun yaygınlığının ve nedenbilimin medeniyetler arasında farklılık gösterdiğini savunmaktadır. Bu çalışmada yetmişin üzerinde ülkeden toplanan Dünya Değerler Anketi'nin sıralı anketlerinden elde edilen zaman serisi verileri Sıralı Probit modelleri kullanılarak analiz edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasi Hoşgörü, Sosyal Hoşgörü, Demokrasi, Dünya Medeniyetleri, Dünya Değerler Araştırması.

INTRODUCTION

Although the debate on tolerance dates back to the beginning of the second half of the 20th century, it has gained fresh prominence with the latest democratization wave. This rekindling of attention in tolerance emerged with the pursuit of revealing cultural elements of democracy. A perusal of the picture drawn from the extant literature speaks to the conclusion that a rich array of values is important for the nourishment of a pro-democratic culture, which is important for the establishment and entrenchment of a well-functioning democratic political system. Establishing a democratic political system is not only important because democracy connotes the incomparable form of government for many people all around the world today, but also because it is obviously proved that there has never been a war between two liberal democracies in the history. Over the past decades numerous studies in this line of research have attempted to explain the link between tolerance and democracy and suggested an association between the two (Lipset, 1959; Almond and Verba 1963; Dahl 1989; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Putnam Leonardi and Nanetti 1993; Sullivan and Transue 1999; Mishler and Rose 2001; Sullivan, Marcus,

Feldman and Piereson 1981; Gibson and Gouws 2005; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Gibson 2006; Sen 2003; Crocker 2004; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Prothro and Grigg 1960; Forst 2018).

According to the definition produced by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1979: 784) tolerance is ‘... willingness to ‘put up with’ those things that one rejects’. As can also be read from this definition, there is a common ground in the tolerance literature that tolerance grows out of negativity. It is closely related to negative evaluation of the opposition and in cases of indifference and ignorance, where there is no room for negative valuation; there is no need for tolerance (Forst 2001, 2018; Brown 2006). One’s viewing of the object of his intolerance as a lesser being conducive to a negative valuation. In politics, one of the ways how bearing negative feelings towards an opponent may manifest itself is viewing this object as not worth of giving equal rights. For that reason, James L. Gibson (1988: 516) defined political tolerance as ‘... willingness of citizens to the extension of the rights of citizenship to all members of the polity, that is, to allow political freedoms to those who are politically different’. Departing from this point the following question may spring to the mind: Is intolerance incompatible with democracy? Gibson (1996: 6) answered this question affirmatively arguing that tolerance is ‘the endorphin of the democratic body politic... no cultural belief is more important for democratizing polities than political tolerance’. Gibson is right in his strong emphasis on the relationship between tolerance and democracy as we know today from data obtained from large-scale cross-national surveys show that in societies where tolerance values are not prevalent or not widespread across different socioeconomic segments of a given country, continuous political tension, political conflicts and even civil wars are likely to emerge. In these countries where stability and order lack it is difficult to establish democratic institutions. Recent conflicts in the Middle East, Central and Northern Africa and the Balkans and low tolerance levels of societies living in these regions hint the existence of a link between the prevalence of tolerance values and democracy. Yet, it would not be fair to argue that tolerance is only important for societies governed by nascent and fledging democratic regimes. In fact, as Gibson argued, tolerance is also a crucially important value for advanced democracies. This is because although each citizen is a full and equal member of the community with fundamental rights and responsibilities in modern advanced democratic societies, coexistence of individuals from different ethnic and religious backgrounds in metropolitan city centres has a potential of resurrecting centuries-old deep-rooted prejudice and threat perceptions. This situation can, in turn, deteriorate tolerance values, which we know from the previous empirical research, are already low and pliable, and pave the way for conflicts and decrease the chances of establishing a peaceful order. Thus, in advanced democracies, where peaceful coexistence of

different cultural groups is crucially important, toleration becomes even a more important value needed for facilitating solving conflicts without needing to apply to undemocratic repressive measures. At this point, Gibson and his colleagues aptly argue that the importance of tolerance has even increased as many countries of the world are moving towards more pluralistic structures (Gibson 1996; Gibson and Duch 1993; Bohman 2003).

Although, starting from the earliest examples of research into the concept of tolerance, tolerance towards different unpopular groups was distinguished from each other by questionnaire items designed to assess tolerance towards different potential groups separately; a systematic categorization among the targets of tolerance has not been done yet. Tolerance towards different potential unpopular groups has mostly been treated as if they are equal elements of one single dimension. Gibson was the first student of tolerance who drew attention to this problem. In his 2006 work, Gibson mentioned several enigmas of tolerance that are waiting for an explanation. They are; (1) threat as an unexplained variable, (2) the multidimensionality of threat perceptions, (3) the independence of social and political intolerance, (4) measuring tolerance, (5) the asymmetry of tolerance and intolerance (Gibson 2006). Regarding to his fifth enigma, Gibson remarks;

A less well-known, but equally significant puzzle lies in the finding that social intolerance (prejudice in particular) and political intolerance are not necessarily closely connected... No theory to date has propounded a differentiated explanation of the origin of social and political intolerance, and thus no unified theory of the etiology of intolerance exists (Gibson 2006: 22).

Departing from this perspective, the main task of this research is going to be developing a better understanding of the concept of tolerance. In order to accomplish this aim, we need to delve into the depths of the concept, understand its dimensions as well as the prevalence and underlying determinants of tolerance in different corners of the world. As a test of Gibson's above quoted argument we will start by investigating the dimensions of tolerance to unravelling some of the mysteries surrounding the concept. Having its dimensions investigated, this research will then turn its interest to examine the extent these tolerance dimensions prevail in different country groups in the world. Although we used civilization as the most appropriate term to label these country groups, this should not be understood deterministically. We used the word civilization only as an overarching term representing the countries sharing similar basic cultural, religious or ethnic inheritance. For a more meticulous analysis, our research will also attempt to analyse the etiology of tolerance across country groups. With its findings, this research adds important qualifications to some previous works in the extant tolerance literature. In order to accomplish

these tasks, the remaining part of the paper is organized in the following way. The theory section serves as a theoretical basis for forthcoming empirical chapters by providing a brief sketch of the discussions revolving around the concept of tolerance. It visits the relationship between democracy and tolerance, etiology of tolerance and the ways of measuring tolerance. In the analysis section, the results of a series of empirical analyses that were carried out to disentangle the general concept of tolerance and its prevalence and etiology across world civilizations are reported. Finally, in the conclusion and discussion section, the findings and their wider implications are discussed.

1. TOLERANCE AND DEMOCRACY

In view of all that has been mentioned about the relationship between tolerance and democracy in the previous section, one may easily hypothesize that tolerance is a crucial value for democracy. The study by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) offers probably the most comprehensive empirical test of this hypothesis. In a cross-sectional study design, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) tested the link between tolerance values and democracy and reported that the vitality of democracy is clearly manifest in countries with established tolerance values. Although their measurement strategy has been limited in explaining the overall nature of tolerance values in countries since using such a measure of tolerance would not provide a full test of tolerance in countries, Inglehart and Welzel's examination of the data coming from societies representing a great portion of the world population is informative in that tolerance is found to be conducive democracy on both individual and national levels. Inglehart and Welzel empirically investigated the relationship between the aggregated out-group tolerance levels and democracy scores of countries and found a significant positive relationship between the two. Their analyses showed that both aggregated general out-group tolerance as well as aggregated tolerance of homosexuals seems to act as impediments for democracy at a system level. Their individual level findings were also consistent with aggregate level ones. They noted that those individuals with lower levels of tolerance (in most cases these are those individuals who occupy isolated jobs such as miners, fishermen, sailors and farmers) towards unpopular groups in the society are more likely to support non-democratic government types and political parties (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

Nevertheless, although limited, there exists some counter-evidence in the literature. Barnum and Sullivan (1990), in their study on Britain and the US, are in clear contrast to the majority of the extant research by arguing that low levels of tolerance do not necessarily pose a threat to democracy. Another research on the topic is of Duch and Gibson (1992) whom in their research, where they reported on the relationship between tolerance and democracy, inquired

European public's tolerance towards jingoistic groups. They asked whether fascists should be allowed to run for public office and should fascist parties be banned and they found a negative relationship on an aggregate level between democratic experience and political tolerance towards fascists. Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that the type of tolerance that investigated by Duch and Gibson was tolerance towards fascists who are known to be reputed anti-democrats. Contrary to their nation level finding, however, they reported that a positive relationship holds on individual level between democratic values and tolerance. In their analysis of the three late democratized European countries, namely Greece, Spain and Portugal, they showed that those generations, which have come of age during these countries' democratization processes, constitute the most tolerant groups (Duch and Gibson, 1992).

2. ETIOLOGY OF TOLERANCE

As can be seen, we appear to be on the sound ground, suggesting that a relationship exists between tolerance and democracy both on individual and nation levels. If tolerance is such a crucial value for the establishment of a democratic political entity it is important to know what makes people and societies more tolerant. Duch and Gibson (1992) suggest that tolerance can be explained as a function of following micro-level factors; perceptions of threat, support for democracy, right consciousness, ideology, political efficacy/alienation, level of education, social status, age, religiosity, gender. In addition to these individual-level predictors, democratic history, prevalence of radical voting and strong party group linkages are also suggested as important macro-level determinants of tolerance (Duch and Gibson 1992). In this part we will look at these and many other factors influencing the level of tolerance values on individual as well as societal levels.

When the determinants lying behind tolerance are investigated, it is seen that a particular attention is drawn to the education level owing to the fact that a fair amount of intolerance comes from this factor only. Education impact on tolerance is buttressed by a wealth of research in the literature. We know from a long train of evidence, including Stouffer (1955), Bobo and Licari (1989), Avery *et al.* (1992), Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978), Davis (1975), Hyman and Wright (1979), Lawrence (1976), Corbett (1980), McClosky (1964), McClosky and Brill (1983), Gibson (1987, 2013), Gibson and Tedin (1988), Duch and Gibson (1992), Peffley, Knigge Hurwitz (2001) that education and tolerance are related. A common ground of this line of research is the idea that educated individuals are more capable of coping with intolerance values. Avery and his colleagues (1992) showed that political tolerance can actually be taught. They tested a group of American students' level of political tolerance before and after teaching them a democratic curriculum and found significant differences

between pre-test and post-test scores (Avery *et. al.* 1992). In line with that, Sullivan and his colleagues' (1993) research shows that tolerance education is breaking the strong link between perceived threat and intolerance. Students can be thought to be tolerant despite of their fears. Following a tolerance education, although the students' level of perceived threat does not change they became more tolerant. In other words, the connection between threat perception and tolerance, which is thought to be automatic, can be broken with tolerance education. Counter-intuitively, however, Merelman's (1980) critical position is cardinal in this regard. Merelman placed substantial emphasis on the idea that schooling does not make young individuals more democratic because school is not a democratic place (Merelman 1980). In addition to the direct tolerance education effect, several conditions can be at work in mediating the education-tolerance relationship. Bobo and Licari (1989) found that richer vocabulary as a surrogate measure of cognitive sophistication accounts for 33% of the education effect on tolerance. The effect is more marked for merely disliked groups in comparison to extremely threatening disliked groups (Bobo and Licari, 1989). Accordingly, Glock (1975) demonstrated that cognitive sophistication has a negative impact on anti-Semitism.

The academic literature on the etiology of tolerance has revealed that perceiving threat inhibits developing tolerance values. It is now well established from a variety of studies that threat perception is of the utmost importance factors to effect tolerance. As threat perception from out-groups salient and greater the level of intolerance seems to be greater (Stouffer 1955; Nunn, Crockett and Williams 1978; Sullivan *et. al.* 1981; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1993; Gibson and Duch 1993; Gibson 1987, 1988, 1989, 1996, 1998; Gibson and Bingham, 1982; Gibson and Tedin 1988; Marcus *et. al.* 2005; Weldon 2006; Gibson and Gouws, 2005; Duch and Gibson, 1992 [in a cross-sectional fashion]; Mueller, 1988; McClosky and Brill, 1983; Altemeyer, 1988; c.f. Butrus and Witenberg, 2013). According to Gibson (1998) threat perception does not only make people more intolerant, but it also appears to play an important role in making people less open to persuasion to change their intolerant beliefs to tolerant ones. In parallel to the findings of the extant literature, Erişen and Erdoğan in their 2019 work show that perceived threat and prejudice are strong determinants of public intolerance for many of the popular out-groups in Turkey in the aftermath of two general elections held in 2015 (Erişen and Erdogan, 219). Erişen (2016) has also shown that the distribution of intolerance towards a varied range of unpopular groups across major political parties' voters in Turkey is quite balanced.

Drawing on an extensive range of sources in the literature one can argue that there also exists a nexus between adherence to the abstract norms of

democracy and tolerance. Scant evidence in the tolerance literature shows that ideas supporting the democratic ideal and its principles play important roles in determining the tolerance level (Lawrance, 1976; McClosky and Brill, 1983; Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, 1982; Sullivan et al., 1985; Marcus et al., 1995; Gibson, 1987; Gibson and Tedin, 1988; Duch and Gibson, 1992; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003). Gibson and Tedin (1988) suggested that commitment to abstract norms of democracy predicts tolerance even more strongly than the perception of threat. According to their research half of the variance can be explained by the inclusion of perceptions of threat and commitment to abstract norms of democracy. With this occasion, Peffley and Rohrschneider's (2003) work requires mentioning owing to their unique comparative approach and findings suggesting basically that democratic history and federalist institutions have a positive impact on tolerance as well as citizens which use civil liberties are more likely to be tolerant. In addition to these findings, their investigation revealed that socioeconomic development has no direct impact on tolerance.

We do not have the intention to fully account for all the determinants of tolerance in the literature here, but some other prominent ones to effect tolerance are democratic socialization (Duch and Gibson, 1992; Andersen and Fetner, 2008; c.f. İnan, 2006; c.f. İnan and Grasso, 2017), authoritarian personality (Sanford, 1973; McClosky and Brill, 1983; Sullivan *et. al.*, 1981; Sneiderman, 1975), intergroup contact (Gibson, 2006), political thinking (Patterson 1979), principle thinking (Eyler, 1980), emphatic concern (Butrus and Witenberg, 2013), moral reasoning (Breslin, 1982), intellectual skills (Bobo and Licari, 1989), psychological security (Sullivan *et. al.*, 1981; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, 1979; Gibson, 1987; Bobo and Licari, 1989), conservatism (McClosky, 1960; McClosky and Brill, 1983; Lipset and Raab, 1970; Sullivan et al., 1982; Bobo and Licari, 1989), close-mindedness (Gibson, 1987; McCrae and Costa, 1997; Vogt, 1997); low self-esteem (Adorno *et. al.* 1950; Sniderman, 1975; McClosky and Brill, 1983; Sullivan Piereson, and Marcus, 1979; Zellman and Sears, 1971; Gibson, 1987); dogmatism (Adorno *et. al.* 1950; Sullivan Piereson, and Marcus, 1982; Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, 1993; Gibson, 1987; Gibson and Duch, 1993; Feldman, 1989; Peffley Knigge and Hurwits, 1998) and diversity in urban space (Wessel, 2009), gender (Duch and Gibson, 1992).

3. MEASURING TOLERANCE

In the tolerance literature, three major competing measurements are used to gauge tolerance: Stouffer's fixed-group measurement, Sullivan and his colleagues' least-liked group measurement and the measurement, which gauges support for restrictive public laws and policies. Stouffer's landmark work, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*, occupies a very important place in the tolerance literature. It is the first of a series of empirical investigations of

tolerance of some particular 'deviant' groups, which were at the time thought by many to be endangering American society. Consistent with the spirit of his time, Stouffer, in his research, investigated American public's readiness to give a number of basic civil liberties to three pre-selected groups; communists, socialists and atheists. Stouffer's investigation covered a series of inquiries questioning whether the members of these three groups should be restricted from certain activities. His investigation included inquiries whether they should be allowed to teach and speak in public, a book written by them should be removed from the library and their telephone conversations should be taped. Stouffer's research revealed that although it was also considerably lower for socialists and atheists, US public's tolerance was particularly low for the communists. Nevertheless, Stouffer predicted that tolerance would grow in the future, owing to several factors, including increasing education levels, change in child-rearing practices and increasing geographical movement of people (Stouffer, 1955). There has been an upsurge of interest in testing the Stoufferian rising tolerance prediction. One apostle of this line of research, Davis (1975) found a 22% increase in tolerance between 1954 and 1971. According to Davis 4 % of this increase is due to education, 5 % is due to cohort replacement and 13 % is due to increasing levels of tolerance in all cohort and education groups. Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978) followed the same line of research and repeated Stouffer's test with the same out-groups and supported the idea that the American public become more welcoming the same unpopular groups Stouffer studied. It can be argued that their findings had implications for the elitist theory of democracy. By looking at this trend, one could argue that in the future the US society will no longer need elites as the careers of the 'democratic creed' since owing to factors, including education and generational replacement the public is expected to be more tolerant each and every year.

Nevertheless, Stouffer's method of measuring tolerance as well as his findings and rising tolerance prediction received some very serious criticism in the literature. The most resonant criticism came from Sullivan and his colleagues who cast doubt against Stouffer's method and claimed that the respondents' choice of their own out-group is crucially important to reveal the real tolerance level. According to Sullivan and his colleagues, Stouffer's mere focus on left-wing groups created a content bias. They argued that although intolerance towards communists, socialists and atheists has declined owing to the spirit of the times and intolerance for other out-groups replaced it. In order to tackle this problem, Sullivan and his colleagues proposed an alternative conceptualization and new measurement of tolerance. Unlike Stoufferian measurement strategy, their least-liked protocol, initially allowed respondents to specify their own out-groups from a list of potentially unwanted groups in the society which can be further expanded during the survey by inclusion of respondents' mention of out-

of-list groups. Following revealing the respondents' most disliked group, then the respondents were asked a series of questions to measure the extent they are tolerant to this particular group. With content-controlled measure, Sullivan and his colleagues found only a marginal increase in tolerance in the US between 1950s and 1970s. Although tolerance for communists, atheists and socialist might have increased, the overall level of tolerance has not changed much. They argued that their findings differed from those of the previous research because communists, socialists and atheists were politically quiescent groups and were not anymore viewed as significant as they used to be during the McCarty Era. Thus, Stouffer's method was time-bound. It may have worked in 1950s, but it did not work as some new targets of intolerance had emerged (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, 1979).

Another challenge to Stoufferian prediction came from Mondak and Sanders (2003). Using a binary measurement, let alone an increase; Mondak and Sanders found a marginal decrease in tolerance in the US between the years 1976 and 1998. Using the standard GSS tolerance battery in a new fashion, Mondak and Sanders investigated tolerance for racist, militarist, atheists, homosexuals, and communists. They claimed that tolerance should be measured not in a continuous but in a binary fashion because one unit move from 0 to 1 is both qualitatively and quantitatively different from one unit move from 12 to 13 on a 0-15 scale. In their measurement only pure tolerants, who score 0, are considered as tolerant and all the scores that are greater than 0 are considered as intolerant. These people correspond to only 18% of the society according to their analysis (Mondak and Sanders 2003).

The tolerance concept, however, is too complex to be measured entirely by the application of any single approach since both Stouffer's and Sullivan and his colleagues' methods were suggested to have some halting points. Gibson (1992), a prominent student of tolerance, compared both methods and reported that tolerance has declined in the US when it was measured with the former, but it was not when measured with the latter. Another important difference Gibson (1992) found was that of the role of education in tolerance. When measured with Stouffer's method, a positive educational effect on tolerance could be detected; however, such an influence could not be observed when tolerance was measured with that of Sullivan and his colleagues. In general, according to Gibson's comparison Stouffer's indices did not seem to be closely correlated with Sullivan and his colleagues' ones. Only when some determinants of tolerance were compared, two measures and their derivatives could be used interchangeably (Gibson, 1992). In a later work, Gibson (2013) consolidated his previous views by arguing that different measures of political tolerance gauge different constructs, and therefore, should not be regarded as interchangeable. Gibson also noted in this work that intolerance in the US is still widespread and different

from earlier studies new groups were being involved in the nonconformist group list such as radical Muslims (Gibson 2013).

Based on this theoretical framework, this research offers three empirical hypotheses. Based on the previous literature on tolerance, the first hypothesis is proposed to test empirically the idea that interpersonal tolerance has more than one dimension. It is thought that these differences are in both kind and degree. Based on the political culture research the second hypothesis offers that there are significant differences between interpersonal tolerance levels of world civilizations. The third hypothesis puts forward the idea that there are also differences between world civilizations regarding to the etiology of interpersonal tolerance.

4. DATA AND METHODS

In this research, we adopted our method of measuring tolerance relying on the above theoretical and methodological discussions. Owing to unavailability of any other cross-sectional data involving variables of our interest, we recruited the World Values Survey (WVS) data involving measurements of tolerance and its three potentially strongest determinants for eight major world civilizations. Understandably, our strategy of constructing our dependent variable is determined by the characteristics of our variable of interest in this data set. The operational strategies that we applied are described below.

In the WVS, respondents' tolerance towards potential unpopular groups was assessed by means of a battery-type question asking whether the respondents would like to have neighbours from some potential unpopular groups. Responses on questionnaires about seven groups were collected repeatedly in subsequent waves of the survey that were conducted in the majority of the countries. These groups are; (a) people of a different race, (b) people of a different religion, (c) immigrant/foreign worker, (d) heavy drinkers, (e) people who have AIDS, (f) drug addict and (g) homosexuals. The answers were dummy-coded with possible outcomes (1) for affirmative responses representing tolerance and (0) for non-affirmative responses representing intolerance and additive scales in which higher scores indicated a higher level of tolerance were generated.¹

Our independent variables are those, which much of the above theoretical discussion centres. We have incorporated three key independent variables identified by the extant research. They are democratic support, education level

¹ Two dimensions of tolerance was discovered in the analyses as will be illustrated in the following pages. The first dimension consists of three and the second consists of four questionnaire items.

and interpersonal trust.² All the dependent variables are coded so that higher scores show greater education, greater support for democracy and greater interpersonal trust. Our education level variable is derived from the question asking: ‘What is the highest education level that you have attained?’ The answer categories rank from (1) no formal education to (9) university-level education, with a degree. Our second independent variable is measuring the level of popular support for democracy. Respondents were asked to indicate on a four-point modified Likert scale their answers to the following battery-type question: ‘I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?’ We used the responses given to the questionnaire item endorsing democracy as the best form of government. We reverse-coded the answer categories as: (1) very bad, (2) fairly bad, (3) fairly good, (4) very good, so higher scores stand for greater embracement the democratic ideal. Finally, we used data provided by the question measuring respondents’ assessments of trustworthiness of most people. The question reads: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people.’ We recoded the answer categories as: (0) need to be very careful and (1) most people can be trusted.

Our data set was culled from four waves of the survey that was conducted between 1994 and 2014 in 6 Confucian, 1 Hindu, 23 Islamic, 15 Western, 19 Slavic-Orthodox, 10 Latin American and 9 African countries (See Appendix A). Those respondents giving ‘no answer’ or ‘don’t know’ to any of the questions used for the analysis of this research were set to missing. Our final dataset consist of a total number of 163.175 surveys which makes our sample is of a respectable size. It should be noted that good coverage of the countries and appropriate number of cases provide a robust empirical test. Moreover, being drawn from the different milieus with decades' time lag, this dataset provided both temporally and spatially comprehensive information. Finally, all the data management and analyses were carried out using STATA program, version 11.2.

5. ANALYSES

This section first presents the findings of analyses aiming to dissociate dimensions of interpersonal tolerance, then those of analyses examining the extent dimensions of tolerance prevail in different civilizations and finally those of analyses revealing some key factors underlying dimensions of tolerance differ across civilizations. Our first set of analysis aimed to distinguish between different dimensions of interpersonal tolerance. In order to accomplish this aim,

² Owing to unavailability of the data interpersonal trust variable is selected to operate as a proxy mirror term for threat perception.

we presented descriptive statistics for tolerance of the most popular out-groups and a Factor Analysis (FA) of these items. FA is a data reduction method, which suffices our purpose of revealing different dimensions within the general concept of tolerance. Together with FA, we employed varimax orthogonal rotation in order to achieve more interpretable factors (Kaiser 1958). Before running an FA, however, we ran two pre-tests, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test and Barlet's test of sphericity. The second set of analysis examined to what extent each dimension of interpersonal tolerance prevails in different world civilizations. We used One-Way-Anova test to reveal significant differences between each civilization's attitudes towards our group of items. Finally, the third set of analyses used Ordered Probit models to reveal some key factors underlying tolerance dimensions.

At the outset, we start with summary statistics of tolerance towards seven out-groups introduced in the previous section. Percentage scores for each questionnaire item are divided by civilizations and presented in **Table 1**.

Table.1: Descriptive statistics for tolerance of out-groups by world civilizations (%)

Tolerance targets/ civilizations	Confucian	Hinduistic	Islamic	Western	Slav/ Orthodox	Latin American	African
People of a different race	80	57	72	93	81	91	81
People of a different religion	83	57	69	94	79	90	80
Immigrants/ foreign workers	71	63	65	88	77	90	81
Heavy drinkers	31	53	30	37	24	46	36
Drug addicts	12	51	21	24	15	27	19
People who have AIDS	33	58	38	86	43	79	68
Homosexuals	48	65	34	86	34	66	21

Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1990/1996/2001/2007/2011.

Number of observations: 163.175.

As can be seen from **Table 1**, tolerance levels towards people of a different race, people of a different religion and immigrants/foreign workers are considerably higher than tolerance levels towards heavy drinkers, drug addicts, people who have AIDS and homosexuals in all the civilizations with one single exception in Hinduistic culture.

Correlation scores speak to a similar classification between tolerance towards the first three and tolerance towards the last four tolerance targets. **Table 2** presents the results of the correlation analysis of the combined data set.

Table.2: Correlation scores across tolerance of out-groups

Tolerance targets	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. People of a different race						
2. People of a different religion	0.49***					
3. Immigrants/foreign workers	0.45***	0.41***				
4. Heavy drinkers	-0.02***	-0.00	0.05***			
5. Drug Addicts	-0.12***	-0.10***	-0.02***	0.48***		
6. People who have AIDS	0.22***	0.22***	0.25***	0.27***	0.28***	
7. Homosexuals	0.10***	0.12***	0.15***	0.32***	0.35***	0.46***

Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1990/1996/2001/2007/2011.

Number of observations: 163.175.

Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Table 2 shows that correlation scores across the first three tolerance targets rank between 0.41 and 0.49. On the other hand, correlation scores across the last four tolerance targets rank between 0.27 and 0.48. Equally important, the correlation scores across any targets from the first group and anyone from the second group do not exceed 0.25 and for some pairs of targets it decreases to zero.

The differences in tolerance levels and intragroup correlation scores affirm the meaningfulness of our hypothesis suggesting a distinction between tolerance towards the first three and the last four tolerance targets. Our analysis shows that both groups of variables constitute relatively compact constructs. Although we have sufficient evidence by now, for a more robust investigation, we run a Factor Analysis (FA). Before running an FA, we ran a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test and Barlet’s test of sphericity to decide for the adequacy of our items for an FA (See Appendix B).

Having these scores in hand, we turned to run an FA (See Appendix C for pre-tests).

Table 3 presents the results of an FA with varimax orthogonal rotation.

Table.3: Factors with varimax orthogonal rotation


Variables	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
People of a different race	0.67	-0.01	0.54
People of a different religion	0.63	0.01	0.59
Immigrants/foreign workers	0.60	0.09	0.62
Heavy drinkers	-0.02	0.60	0.63
Drug Addicts	-0.14	0.63	0.57
People who have AIDS	0.32	0.51	0.60
Homosexuals	0.18	0.57	0.61
Eigenvalue	1.38	1.37	

Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1990/1996/2001/2007/2011.

Number of observations: 163.175.

As can be seen from **Table 3**, the first two factors exceed the recommended cutoff eigenvalue of 1.00 (Hayton, Allen and Scarpello 2004). As supported by descriptive statistics and correlation scores, a factor analytic investigation also supports a strong bi-dimensional structure. Each item has more than 0.50 and five out of seven items have more than the cutoff value of 0.60 loadings to their extracted factors (Hair, 2006). This finding required us to make two indices, the first one involving the first three items, tolerance towards people of a different race, immigrant/foreign workers and people of a different religion, and the second one involving the last four, tolerance towards heavy drinkers, people who have AIDS, drug addicts and homosexuals. Our empirical findings have a fit with the nationalistic emphasis of the items in the first component and the social emphasis of the items in the second component, corresponding to previous discussions on the difference between political tolerance and social tolerance.

Figure 1 tells the story that was told in the Table 1 in another way. It shows percentage values as well as error bars showing significant differences achieved by One-Way-Anova test of political tolerance and social tolerance averaged for country groups.



As can be seen from **Figure 1**, the political tolerance is higher than the social tolerance in all civilizations without a single exception. The difference is only marginal in the Hinduistic civilization. Apart from this single case, the

average difference is by over 30%, reaching to 50% in the Slavic/Orthodox one. The figure also shows that all the differences pertaining to political tolerance and social tolerance are significantly different at the 95% level from each other.

Our final set of analyses aims to examine the question whether the etiology of tolerance differs across world civilizations. In order to investigate this matter and provide a more stringent cross-cultural test of tolerance, we recruited three most prominent determinants of tolerance; democratic support, education level and interpersonal trust as independent variables and run our analyses for each world civilization. **Table 4** presents findings of a series Ordered Probit (OP) models predicting political and social tolerance by world civilizations.

Table.4: Ordered probit models predicting political and social tolerance by world civilizations (Table continued on next page)

	Confucian		Hinduistic		Islamic		Western	
	<i>Political Tolerance</i>	<i>Social Tolerance</i>	<i>Political Tolerance</i>	<i>Social Tolerance</i>	<i>Political Tolerance</i>	<i>Social Tolerance</i>	<i>Political Tolerance</i>	<i>Social Tolerance</i>
Education level								
Inadequately comp. Ele.								
Comp. Elementary	0.10 (0.06)	-0.50 (0.05)***	0.10 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.15 (0.02)***	0.05 (0.04)	0.15 (0.03)***
Incomp. Second.	-0.04 (0.07)	0.15 (0.06)*	0.07 (0.09)	-0.19 (0.09)*	0.04 (0.02)	0.15 (0.02)***	0.02 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)
Comp. Second.	0.20 (0.05)**	-0.30 (0.05)***	0.15 (0.09)	-0.24 (0.08)**	0.16 (0.02)***	0.04 (0.02)	0.15 (0.04)**	0.17 (0.03)***
Incomp.Second.Uni.Prep	0.10 (0.08)	-0.22 (0.07)**	-	-	0.25 (0.02)***	0.04 (0.02)	0.25 (0.05)***	0.12 (0.04)**
Comp.Second.Uni.Prep	0.25 (0.05)***	-0.65 (0.05)***	-	-	0.15 (0.02)***	0.02 (0.02)	0.31 (0.05)***	0.17 (0.03)***
Some Uni. W/out degree	0.21 (0.07)**	-0.47 (0.06)***	0.21 (0.09)*	-0.35 (0.09)***	0.16 (0.02)***	0.16 (0.02)***	0.38 (0.05)***	0.10 (0.04)**
Uni. With degree	0.33 (0.05)***	-0.49 (0.05)***	0.28 (0.09)**	-0.19 (0.08)*	0.22 (0.02)***	0.06 (0.02)**	0.53 (0.05)***	0.20 (0.03)**
Democratic Support								
Very bad								
Bad	0.21 (0.08)*	-0.01 (0.08)	0.04 (0.21)	-0.00 (0.20)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.03)*	-0.00 (0.06)***	0.01 (0.05)
Good	0.37 (0.07)***	0.06 (0.07)	0.04 (0.18)	-0.25 (0.18)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.23 (0.03)***	0.18 (0.06)**	0.18 (0.04)***
Very good	0.27 (0.07)***	0.24 (0.07)**	0.12 (0.18)	-0.08 (0.18)	0.06 (0.03)	-0.23 (0.03)***	0.37 (0.06)***	0.28 (0.04)***
Interpersonal trust								
Need to be very careful								
Most ppl. can be trusted	0.21 (0.02)***	0.14 (0.02)***	-0.10 (0.05)*	0.28 (0.04)***	0.05 (0.01)***	0.21 (0.01)***	0.25 (0.01)***	0.14 (0.01)***
Pseudo R ²	0.0095	0.0175	0.0038	0.0102	0.0032	0.0057	0.0309	0.0059

Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1990/1996/2001/2007/2011.

Number of observations: 163.175.

Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Note: Entries are ordered probit estimates with standard error values in parentheses.

Table 4 continued. Ordered probit models predicting political and social tolerance by world civilizations

	Slavic/Orthodox		Latin American		African		Overall	
	Political Tolerance	Social Tolerance	Political Tolerance	Social Tolerance	Political Tolerance	Social Tolerance	Political Tolerance	Social Tolerance
Education level								
Inadequately comp. Ele.								
Comp. Elementary	0.06 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.01)**	-0.03 (0.01)**
Incomp. Second.	0.07 (0.05)	-0.18 (0.05)**	0.11 (0.04)**	0.18 (0.03)***	0.03 (0.04)	0.10 (0.03)**	0.12 (0.01)***	0.11 (0.01)***
Comp. Second.	0.11 (0.04)**	-0.21 (0.04)***	0.19 (0.03)***	0.09 (0.02)**	-0.01 (0.03)	0.10 (0.01)***	0.20 (0.01)***	0.00 (0.01)
Incomp.Second.Uni.Prep	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.24 (0.04)***	0.21 (0.05)***	0.03 (0.03)	0.23 (0.05)***	0.04 (0.04)	0.15 (0.01)***	-0.00 (0.01)
Comp.Second.Uni.Prep	0.05 (0.04)	-0.13 (0.04)**	0.23 (0.04)***	0.05 (0.03)	0.12 (0.04)**	0.00 (0.04)	0.10 (0.01)***	-0.11 (0.01)***
Some Uni. W/out degree	0.16 (0.05)**	-0.00 (0.04)	0.21 (0.05)***	0.21 (0.03)***	-0.01 (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)	0.22 (0.01)***	0.11 (0.01)***
Uni. With degree	0.17 (0.04)***	-0.05 (0.04)	0.21 (0.04)***	0.09 (0.03)**	0.05 (0.05)	0.09 (0.04)*	0.25 (0.01)***	0.00 (0.01)
Democratic Support								
Very bad								
Bad	0.11 (0.04)*	0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)	0.24 (0.09)**	-0.02 (0.08)	0.05 (0.02)*	-0.03 (0.02)
Good	0.15 (0.04)***	-0.04 (0.04)	0.24 (0.06)***	0.05 (0.05)	0.12 (0.08)	-0.17 (0.07)*	0.1 (0.02)***	-0.02 (0.01)
Very good	0.07 (0.04)***	0.04 (0.04)	0.34 (0.06)***	0.04 (0.05)	0.19 (0.07)*	-0.25 (0.06)***	0.20 (0.02)***	0.03 (0.01)
Interpersonal trust								
Need to be very careful								
Most ppl. can be trusted	0.13 (0.01)***	0.08 (0.01)***	-0.03 (0.03)*	0.24 (0.02)***	-0.13 (0.03)***	0.06 (0.02)*	0.16 (0.00)***	0.23 (0.00)***
Pseudo R ²	0.0026	0.0028	0.0073	0.0030	0.0030	0.0024	0.0051	0.0047

Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1990/1996/2001/2007/2011.

Number of observations: 163.175.

Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Note: Entries are ordered probit estimates with standard error values in parentheses.

Some general patterns apparent from our causal analyses are presented in **Table 4**. First, and perhaps the most important one is that the etiology of tolerance can change considerably across civilizations. It should be noted at the outset that the traditional expectation is for strong positive relationships between each of our three factors and tolerance. Our overall findings are largely informative in this, yet when investigated separately, this expectation was not met in each civilization. Our first independent variable, education, seems to have a strong effect on both political and social tolerance in all civilizations, nevertheless the significance and in some cases the sign of the effect changes across them. Education is a strong positive determinant of political tolerance in all civilizations without a single exception. Those who are better educated tend to be more tolerant towards political out-groups. However, as can be seen from the table the significance of the education effect on political tolerance is lower in Hinduistic and African civilizations and the effect is not significant for all levels of education. The picture is even more complicated for education effect on social tolerance. It can be seen from the table that education effect on social tolerance is of less significance in African civilization than in other civilizations. Moreover, the signs of the coefficient scores for Confucian and Hinduistic civilizations are minus, informing a negative education effect on social tolerance, which counterbalances its positive impact on the rest five civilizations and causes a non-significant education effect on many education levels on social tolerance in the overall sample.

When we look at our second independent variable, democratic support, we again observe varied effects across civilizations. In 5 out of 7 civilizations democratic support begets political tolerance, while this is not the case in Hinduistic and Islamic civilizations. In these three civilizations democratic support does not seem to have a significant impact on the political tolerance. Nevertheless, in the overall sample, we can still observe the positive significant effect. The results are also varied for democratic support effect on social tolerance. As can be seen from the table that that in Confucian and Western civilizations, democratic support has a positive and significant impact on social tolerance while the same effect is not significant in Hinduistic, Slavic/Orthodox and Latin American and it is significant but negative in Islamic and African civilizations. The positive effect seems to be counterbalanced by the negative one and in the overall sample, we can achieve a positive significant democratic support effect on social tolerance.

Our third independent variable is interpersonal trust. Our analyses show that interpersonal trust, in the overall sample, provides a highly significant increment to both political and social tolerance. However, there exist some exceptions to this general pattern. While interpersonal trust seems to be a significant determinant of political tolerance in all the civilization, it is a

significant but negative determinant of political tolerance in Hinduistic and African civilizations. On the other hand, unlike in our previous cases for social tolerance the picture seems to be simple. For all the civilizations interpersonal trust is a significant positive factor of social tolerance. Only in African civilization the significance of the effect is lower.

Table 5 in the appendices presents marginal effects for political and social tolerance by civilizations. In addition to that, from **Figure 2** and **Figure 9** in the appendices marginal effects are plotted and the same story is told visually.

Owing to the categorical nature of our dependent variable interpretation of marginal effects requires a particular attention. As the table and the figures in the appendices show, the increase in education brings about increase in political tolerance for all civilizations without an exception and in social tolerance for all civilizations except Confucian and Hinduistic civilizations. Similarly increase in democratic support causes an increase in political tolerance for all civilizations and in social tolerance for all civilizations except Islamic and African civilizations. Lastly, increase in interpersonal trust makes way for an increase in political tolerance in Confucian, Islamic, Slavic/Orthodox civilization, while it brings decrease in Hinduistic, Latin American and African civilizations. On the other hand, increase in interpersonal trust brings an increase in social tolerance in all civilizations without a single exception. As margin plots show in figures, in general, marginal effects are greater at higher levels of political tolerance and in a lesser degree of social tolerance.

6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Cross-national surveys reveal that democracy is extolled as the best form of government all around the globe. It is now known that citizens with a favourable assessment of democracy are in the majority in many countries of the world. It is also known from these surveys that tolerance is one of the foremost values underlying a democratic political system. Thus, in the quest for factors underlying democratic political entity, a growing body of research has recognized pervasive tolerance values in a society as one of the key cultural elements bolstering democratic political system. The common ground of the studies in this line of research is the idea that the more prevalent and strongly rooted tolerance values in a given country the greater the chance that that country is governed by a democratic political system. Especially for today's modern democracies, finding ways to root and foster tolerance values seems to be the most reliable tool to sustain the democratic political system.

There were three primary aims of this research, a) to reveal dimensions of interpersonal tolerance, b) to discover the extent, dimensions of tolerance prevail in different civilizations, b) to investigate how etiology of tolerance differs across

civilizations. Our finding suggesting that at least two dimensions of interpersonal tolerance can be distinguished empirically. Our empirical investigation provided enough credentials to suggest political tolerance and social tolerance as different facets of interpersonal tolerance. Rejecting having a neighbour who is from a different race or a different religion or who is an immigrant/foreign worker is distinguishably different from rejecting having a neighbour who is a heavy drinker, a drug addict, a homosexual or who have AIDS in the minds of the people from all the corners of the world. Moreover, the finding suggesting that political tolerance is, in general, higher than social tolerance, supports the idea that the difference between two is not only of the kind but also of the degree. The difference between the extents, these two dimensions of tolerance prevail in different corners of the world also speaks to the second premise of the research. These two findings fit neatly with the first objective of the study and grants worth to Gibson's (2006) argument suggesting that political intolerance and social intolerance can be distinguished. Our findings also provide empirical support to the findings of Erişen (2016) who has shown that political and social tolerance can be distinguished in the particular Turkish context. Our finding is suggestive but must be treated with caution. Although this study distinguishes between two dimensions of interpersonal tolerance, it is not meant to imply that the research on the dimensions of tolerance come to a halt. We need to be aware that limitations in our data prohibit our knowing what the total number of dimensions of tolerance is. With this finding, this research represents only an early stage of systematic research on the dimensions of tolerance. Thus, it can be read as a harbinger of that this sort of an analysis, which may reveal some additional dimensions of interpersonal tolerance in the future. Future research should extend on increasing the number of out-groups and aim to reveal greater number of tolerance dimensions to ascertain a bigger picture.

Our third major finding was that the key factors underlying tolerance differ across civilizations. There is no apparent reason why the etiology of tolerance differs across cultures. This finding suggests many more questions, including which historical and cultural factors are at work, does the etiology differ across decades, generations, cohorts and etc. Although this finding allowed us to achieve a more fine-tuned assessment of tolerance concept, more work will need to be done to investigate the concept fully and we hope that this research will serve as an impetus for further studies. This sort of an analysis can easily be transferred to other geographical contexts as well as employed in a cross-national fashion and reveal different etiological explanations of tolerance prevailing in different socio-political contexts. Thus, the natural progression of this research is to devise new surveys involving a greater number of potential factors underlying tolerance, may be country-specific ones, in the analysis.

There are some limitations of the research we would like to discuss as the final word. We would like to draw attention to the problems of measuring tolerance with cross-national WVS data. First, as discussed above, there are three advanced methods of measuring tolerance, Stouffer's fixed-group measurement, Sullivan and his colleagues' least-liked group measurement and the one measuring support for restrictive public laws and policies. With the WVS's inquiry strategy, it is impossible to adopt either of these approaches. With the WVS data, which is the most comprehensive data in hand for our research strategy, we can only measure respondents' hypothetical response to the scenario of having a neighbour from a potentially unwelcomed group in the society. For example, we have no chance of knowing whether a respondent is tolerant to a group because he is really tolerant to that group or he is actually a member of this group. Another point is that measuring tolerance across civilizations is naturally problematic. As we know that tolerance is strongly related with personal contact, the likelihood of having an actual contact with a homosexual neighbour or a neighbour with AIDS in a Muslim country is quite lower than in a Western one. This may have two potentially opposite alternative effects. In the first scenario, a respondent, who was born in a Muslim society in which people are less likely to express their homosexuality openly, would simply underestimate or ignore the likelihood of having a homosexual neighbour in real life and would not feel threatened from such a low chance scenario at all. Alternatively, the effect could work in the opposite direction. Lack of personal contact may turn him to a more anti-homosexual. It is difficult to interpret without data in hand, how would each scenario effect the realization of the final outcome. Another limitation of our research, in fact, as shared with the extant research in the tolerance literature, is that it does not provide a full test of tolerance. Tolerance is a multi-dimensional concept and even our limited data reveal that it embodies more than one dimension. Owing to above-mentioned reasons, while interpreting the findings of this research one should be very careful. As the final word, it should also note that although this research has some implications about the relationship between democratic support and tolerance it avoided from delving into the details of the sophisticated relationship between tolerance and democracy which may also follow a causal line operating from having a democratic history or democratic institutions to tolerance values. This is another research avenue for future researchers whom would like to investigate further societal implications of tolerance.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank to Professor Maria T. Grasso for her feedback on an early version of this research.

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Appendices

A. We adopted this categorization of the 83 countries from Huntington's world civilizations thesis. Because most items in the tolerance battery were not asked in the Japanese survey, we discarded this country from our model although Huntington named it as a separate civilization.

B. We achieved .71 overall KMO and over 0.66 individual KMO scores (results not shown), which imply that, the original variables are sufficiently correlated with some components (Field 2000). In addition to that, a Barlett's test of sphericity score, which was lower than 0.05 also implied that the data comes from a multivariate normal distribution with zero covariance, in other words variances are equal across groups (Snedecor and Cochran, 1989).

C. Before we run an FA we looked at the correlation score between these two potential indices. The correlation score between these two indices was 0.14 (results not shown). Owing the low correlation between the indices and following Kim and Mueller's as well as Bryant and Yarnold's advices, we preferred using varimax orthogonal rotation. Rotations are used to achieve more pronounce patterns of loadings and reveal a simpler structure (Kim and Mueller, 1978; Bryant and Yarnold, 1995).

Tables

Table.5: Marginal effects for political and social tolerance by world civilizations (Table continued on next page)

	Confucian		Hinduistic		Islamic		Western	
	<i>Political Tolerance</i>	<i>Social Tolerance</i>	<i>Political Tolerance</i>	<i>Social Tolerance</i>	<i>Political Tolerance</i>	<i>Social Tolerance</i>	<i>Political Tolerance</i>	<i>Social Tolerance</i>
Education level								
1	0.11 (0.00)***	0.28 (0.00)***	0.27 (0.01)***	0.16 (0.01)***	0.17 (0.00)***	0.52 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.00)***	0.05 (0.00)***
2	0.10 (0.00)***	0.30 (0.00)***	0.25 (0.01)***	0.17 (0.01)***	0.16 (0.00)***	0.51 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.05 (0.00)***
3	0.09 (0.00)***	0.31 (0.00)***	0.24 (0.01)***	0.18 (0.00)***	0.15 (0.00)***	0.50 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.05 (0.00)***
4	0.09 (0.00)***	0.33 (0.00)***	0.23 (0.00)***	0.19 (0.00)***	0.14 (0.00)***	0.49 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.00)***	0.05 (0.00)***
5	0.08 (0.00)***	0.34 (0.00)***	0.22 (0.00)***	0.20 (0.00)***	0.14 (0.00)***	0.48 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.00)***
6	0.07 (0.00)***	0.36 (0.00)***	0.21 (0.00)***	0.21 (0.00)***	0.13 (0.00)***	0.48 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.00)***
7	0.07 (0.00)***	0.37 (0.00)***	0.20 (0.00)***	0.22 (0.01)***	0.12 (0.00)***	0.47 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.00)***
8	0.06 (0.00)***	0.39 (0.00)***	0.19 (0.01)***	0.23 (0.01)***	0.12 (0.00)***	0.46 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.00)***
Democratic Support								
1	0.09 (0.00)***	0.46 (0.01)***	0.26 (0.03)***	0.24 (0.02)***	0.17 (0.00)***	0.44 (0.00)***	0.05 (0.00)***	0.08 (0.00)***
2	0.08 (0.00)***	0.41 (0.00)***	0.25 (0.01)***	0.22 (0.01)***	0.16 (0.00)***	0.46 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.06 (0.00)***
3	0.08 (0.00)***	0.35 (0.00)***	0.23 (0.01)***	0.21 (0.00)***	0.14 (0.00)***	0.48 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.00)***	0.05 (0.00)***
4	0.08 (0.00)***	0.30 (0.00)***	0.21 (0.01)***	0.19 (0.00)***	0.13 (0.00)***	0.50 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.00)***
Interpersonal trust								
1	0.06 (0.00)***	0.31 (0.00)***	0.24 (0.01)***	0.15 (0.01)***	0.13 (0.00)***	0.42 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.00)***
2	0.04 (0.00)***	0.27 (0.01)***	0.28 (0.03)***	0.09 (0.01)***	0.12 (0.00)***	0.34 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***
Pseudo R ²	0.0063	0.0072	0.0032	0.0072	0.0023	0.0036	0.0301	0.0047

Note: Entries are margins with standard error values in parentheses.

Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1990/1996/2001/2007/2011.

Number of observations: 163.175.

Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Table 5 continued. Marginal effects for political and social tolerance by world civilizations

	Slavic/Orthodox		Latin American		African		Overall	
	<i>Political Tolerance</i>	<i>Social Tolerance</i>	<i>Political Tolerance</i>	<i>Social Tolerance</i>	<i>Political Tolerance</i>	<i>Social Tolerance</i>	<i>Political Tolerance</i>	<i>Social Tolerance</i>
Education level								
1	0.08 (0.00)***	0.44 (0.00)***	0.05 (0.01)***	0.10 (0.01)***	0.07 (0.00)***	0.18 (0.00)***	0.10 (0.00)***	0.31 (0.00)***
2	0.08 (0.00)***	0.43 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.01)***	0.10 (0.01)***	0.07 (0.00)***	0.17 (0.00)***	0.09 (0.00)***	0.30 (0.00)***
3	0.08 (0.00)***	0.42 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.01)***	0.09 (0.00)***	0.07 (0.00)***	0.17 (0.00)***	0.09 (0.00)***	0.29 (0.00)***
4	0.07 (0.00)***	0.42 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.00)***	0.09 (0.00)***	0.07 (0.00)***	0.17 (0.00)***	0.08 (0.00)***	0.28 (0.00)***
5	0.07 (0.00)***	0.41 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.09 (0.00)***	0.07 (0.00)***	0.17 (0.00)***	0.08 (0.00)***	
6	0.07 (0.00)***	0.41 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.09 (0.00)***	0.06 (0.00)***	0.16 (0.00)***	0.07 (0.00)***	0.28 (0.00)***
7	0.07 (0.00)***	0.40 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.09 (0.01)***	0.06 (0.00)***	0.16 (0.00)***	0.07 (0.00)***	0.28 (0.00)***
8	0.06 (0.00)***	0.40 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.01)***	0.08 (0.01)***	0.06 (0.00)***	0.16 (0.00)***	0.06 (0.00)***	0.28 (0.00)***
Democratic Support								
1	0.08 (0.00)***	0.44 (0.01)***	0.07 (0.00)***	0.10 (0.02)***	0.08 (0.00)***	0.11 (0.00)***	0.10 (0.00)***	0.31 (0.00)***
2	0.08 (0.00)***	0.43 (0.00)***	0.05 (0.00)***	0.09 (0.01)***	0.08 (0.00)***	0.13 (0.00)***	0.09 (0.00)***	0.30 (0.00)***
3	0.07 (0.00)***	0.41 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.00)***	0.09 (0.00)***	0.07 (0.00)***	0.15 (0.00)***	0.08 (0.00)***	0.29 (0.00)***
4	0.07 (0.00)***	0.40 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.09 (0.00)***	0.07 (0.00)***	0.18 (0.00)***	0.07 (0.00)***	0.28 (0.00)***
Interpersonal trust								
1	0.06 (0.00)***	0.39 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.01)***	0.06 (0.01)***	0.08 (0.00)***	0.16 (0.00)***	0.06 (0.00)***	0.23 (0.00)***
2	0.04 (0.00)***	0.36 (0.01)***	0.04 (0.03)***	0.04 (0.01)***	0.11 (0.00)***	0.14 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.00)***	0.16 (0.00)***
Pseudo R ²	0.0063	0.0072	0.0032	0.0072	0.0023	0.0036	0.0301	0.0047

Note: Entries are margins with standard error values in parentheses.

Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1990/1996/2001/2007/2011.

Number of observations: 163.175.

Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Figures




Figure 2. Predictive Margins for Political and Social Tolerance in Confucian Civilization




Figure 3. Predictive Margins for Political and Social Tolerance in Hinduistic Civilization




Figure 4. Predictive Margins for Political and Social Tolerance for Islamic Civilization




Figure 5. Predictive Margins for Political and Social Tolerance in Western Civilization




Figure 6. Predictive Margins for Political and Social Tolerance in Slavic/Orthodox Civilization




Figure 7. Predictive Margins for Political and Social Tolerance for Latin American Civilization




Figure 8. Predictive Margins for Political and Social Tolerance in African Civilization




Figure 9. Predictive Margins for Political and Social Tolerance for All Civilizations